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Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press (Pitt Series in Russian and East European 
Studies), 2014, x + 396 p. 
Gábor Rittersporn, an eminent social historian of Russia in Stalin’s time, has 
written a blockbuster. In the introduction, he proposes a “conservative” agenda—
one that returns to the roots of the revisionist approach to Soviet social history. 
Before revisionism, he suggests, historians focused on the “input” side, meaning 
the decisions and policies that emanated from the leaders of the party‑state (p. 2). 
Revisionist historians of society turned attention to the “output” side: faced with 
these decisions and policies, what did ordinary people do, and with what results? 
Now there is also “post‑revisionism”: in those circumstances, what did ordinary 
people think and feel as they went about their lives? Rittersporn’s agenda is 
conservative in that his goal reverts to understanding of the outputs, chief among 
which was the eventual collapse of the Soviet system. But it is still revisionist, 
drawing on all the insights of the revisionists concerning the lived experience of 
that system.
The book is divided into three parts, each divided into three chapters. In Part 1 
“Anguish,” chapter  1 is entitled “The omnipresent conspiracy.” This chapter 
describes the conspiracy thinking of leading Bolsheviks on two dimensions: their 
belief in the hidden coordination of internal and external enemies, matched by their 
own conspiratorial practices. The chapter shows that such beliefs were not confined 
to the elite, but resonated widely in society. Chapter 2, “Catching spies, trapping the 
system” discusses the spy mania of the time, correlates it with available evidence 
about actual spies and saboteurs, and recounts the casualties, including the victims 
when it was the turn of the secret police to be savagely purged. This is the sense 
in which the system became “trapped” by its own beliefs. The chapter argues 
that Russian courts still fail to deal properly with the historical perpetrators and 
victims of the spy mania, so the trap is still in place today. Chapter 3, “Between 
Catastrophe and the promised land,” deals with the thorny issue of popular support 
for the regime, and mass repressions as a response to the lack of it. It stresses regime 
perceptions of popular discontent derived from secret police reports, and argues 
that in 1937 the growing “war scare” was a contingent, not sufficient cause of the 
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“mass operations,” given that previous war scares did not have the same results 
(p. 76).
Part 2, “Anger,” begins with chapter  4, subtitled “Endemic violence, angry 
youth, angry Bolsheviks.” The subject of this chapter is the violence that young 
Soviet people met with every day in the 1930s, and the political overtones frequently 
ascribed to it. Chapter 5, “Loyalty and lost hope,” deals with the anger of citizens 
not with the Revolution as such, but with the Revolution’s outcomes: the failures 
of food security, personal security, and international security. Chapter 6, “Rebels,” 
turns to the cases of those who converted their anger into social and political action. 
Often enough they were true believers, motivated by the gap between Bolshevism’s 
goals and practices. The chapter points out that true believers of this sort were to be 
found in the communist leadership as late as the 1980s.
In Part 3, “Folkways,” chapter 7 is called “Breaking Step, Enjoying Carnival.” 
Just as revolution turned the world upside down, so did humour and burlesque. 
Their influence reached far into the party, at the same time as party leaders 
coordinated its repression. Chapter 8 is about “Entrepreneurship.” Entrepreneurs 
are defined after Josef Schumpeter, not as people who want to create an unknown 
world, but as people who rearrange the known world in new ways (p. 217). In that 
sense, it is true, the Soviet economy and state had a myriad entrepreneurs. But 
it neglects what Schumpeter saw as the outcome of entrepreneurship: “creative 
destruction,” something that the Soviet economy was designed to rule out. The 
chapter acknowledges this in passing: entrepreneurial innovation “brought 
modifications but not fundamental change” (p. 246). Anyway, the chapter’s point 
is that the Soviet economy forced millions to pursue ingenious survival strategies 
that, like their humour, sometimes greased the machine and sometimes corroded 
it. Chapter 9, the final chapter, is subtitled, “Misadventures of modernity.” The 
misadventures are those of the officials, who thought they were building a brave 
new modern world as they blundered about, and also the missteps of the citizens, 
who continually stumbled into the gap between programmes and outcomes.
Throughout his book, Rittersporn draws on a wealth of episodes and experiences 
found in public and private archives, diaries, and letters. These descriptions are 
what gives the book its life. In the process, the book lives up to a promise that 
the author gives in the introduction: “The term state will … be used as sparingly 
… as possible” (p. 7). In the Soviet Union (or perhaps anywhere) “the state” was 
not a thing apart from society. Decisions were made and policies pursued, not by 
“the state” but by identifiable human actors, singly and in groups. The logic of this 
becomes fully apparent in the epilogue, where Rittersporn attributes the collapse of 
the Soviet state to toleration of the entrepreneurial folkways that agents of the state 
adopted in response to the state’s own shortcomings.
The book has some shortcomings. Moving through its landscape, we often have 
no idea where the path leads, or why we must enter the marsh instead of skirting 
round it. The horizon is fog‑bound. We long for signposts, which the author provides 
as chapter headings and subheadings, but these are no use because they point to 
places we’ve never heard of: “Data, Successes, Blunders” (p. 50); “Ambivalent 
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loyalty” (p. 114); “False Prophets and Closet Rebels” (p. 159). Even the book’s title 
becomes a mystery, because what separates anguish from anger in the historical 
record is rarely made apparent. This is an author that likes to tease the reader more 
than to help.
A strong message of the book is that the attempt to create a planned economy led 
to chaos, and that the Bolsheviks’ totalitarian aspirations were continually subverted 
by the counter‑strategies of the subjects. It’s a fair point, although not new. It also 
leaves something out: the planned economy that the Bolsheviks created was, for a 
considerable time, a success. Not a success, perhaps, for the ordinary workers and 
peasants who had to make it work, but still a success for its creators. Lenin and Stalin 
wanted a centralized command system for the mass production of things, especially 
of the things that they saw as means of power in the world: locomotives, lathes, 
power stations, ships, tanks, and planes. Here was the system, even if many people 
experienced it as chaos, and the system worked, turning a third‑class economy into 
a first‑class military power. After many years the system collapsed, but not before it 
had qualified as one of the most durable of modern dictatorships.
This important book is certain to have an influence on future scholarly research 
and on the teaching of Russia’s social history. How widespread that influence will 
be is not entirely clear. For some readers it will be enough to dip into the pool and 
catch hold of some fascinating gem. Others will require plenty of deep breathing 





The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics
Princeton et Oxford : Princeton University Press, 2015, 364 p.
Il a fallu attendre longtemps avant que les historiens de l’époque soviétique ne 
commencent à accepter l’idée que Stalin n’agissait pas dans un vacuum. Nombre 
d’adeptes de la confrérie ne sont pas encore tout à fait certains que le dictateur ait 
eu à trouver un modus vivendi avec la réticence des paysans à se plier à sa politique 
rurale, ni s’il avait été bien avisé d’adapter sa politique pénale à la résilience d’une 
criminalité sociale engendrée par le régime lui‑même ou s’il avait dû composer 
avec un appareil de l’État‑parti, où les réseaux d’assistance mutuelle des cadres 
se reconstituaient et persistaient, même après des purges meurtrières. De ce fait, 
l’approbation unanime par les collègues d’un ouvrage qui montre que l’équipe diri‑
geante du père des peuples soviétiques n’était pas qu’un instrument docile n’est 
pas acquise. 
Pourtant, Sheila Fitzpatrick argumente bien son cas. Elle identifie un noyau dur 
au sein du Politbureau du Parti qui, ayant survécu à toutes les vicissitudes d’une 
